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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last decade there exists evidence of an increasing number of corporate collapses 
including Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and HealthSouth. In Australia, notable failures include 
HIH Insurance, OneTel, Ansett Airlines and Fincorp. Such collapses of financially distressed 
companies often entails significant direct and indirect costs to many stakeholders. There is a 
view that these costs can be avoided if financially distressed companies are identified well 
before their ultimate failure. Lau (1987) argues that such companies face a continuum of 
financial distress states before they go bankrupt. Hensher, Jones and Greene (2007) argue that 
a model that incorporates multiple states of financial distress provides a wider range of 
distress scenarios that public companies typically face in the real world. The literature on the 
predictions of traditional corporate financial distress in general focusses on the conventional 
failing and non-failing dichotomy. For example, Altman (1968b), Ohlson (1980) and 
Shumway (2001) examine the companies that actually went bankrupt. Jones and Hensher 
(2007) argue that the inclusion of multiple states of financially distressed companies in the 
model provides an opportunity to examine the effect of explanatory variables across the 
diverse states of financial distress. 
A company may exit the market for several different reasons: such as through merger, 
acquisition, voluntary liquidation and bankruptcy; and each type of exit is likely to be 
affected by different factors (Schary 1991; Harhoff, Stahl & Woywode 1998; Prantl 2003; 
Rommer 2004). Johnsen and Melicher (1994) examined the added value of the information 
provided in predicting corporate bankruptcy by defining three states of financial distress, 
namely: non-bankrupt, financially weak and bankrupt firms. Dickerson, Gibson and 
Tsakalotos (1999) investigated the determinants of UK manufacturing companies making 
acquisitions and being acquired. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) assumed that the causal 
processes for acquisitions and failures were different, and utilised the competing-risks hazard 
model to identify the characteristics that made individual US banks more likely to fail or be 
acquired. Harhoff, Stahl & Woywode 1998, Prantl (2003) and Rommer (2004) also 
confirmed the importance of distinguishing between different types of corporate exits. 
In the Australian context, Jones and Hensher (2004) introduced the three-state 
financial distress model to examine the listed companies in the ASX (Australian Stock 
Exchange). This study was extended by Hensher, Jones and Greene (2007) and Jones and 
Hensher (2007), who added the distressed merger as an additional important state of financial 
distress. These studies used the advanced logit model (i.e. the mixed logit, multinomial error 
component logit and nested logit model). However, none of these studies considered ‘time to 
failure’ as an integral factor in corporate distress analysis. We use a competing risks Cox 
proportional hazard model, which enables the incorporation of time to event as the dependent 
variable in corporate distress analysis. Also, the variables used in the model are time-
dependent variables (i.e. they can change in value over the study period). 
Our analysis is based on three main categories of variables: financial ratios, market-
based data and company-specific variables. We use a sample of publicly listed Australian 
companies (except those in the financial sector), during the period 1989 to 2005. In so doing, 
three different states of financial distress are employed: active companies, distressed external 
administration companies and distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. The 
determinants of each state are examined and interpreted through the competing-risks model. 
In order to examine the determinant of the three states of these financial distresses, we 
investigate the effects of financial data, market-based variables and company-specific 
variables on the three unordered states of financially distressed Australian companies. We 
also compare the pooled model with the competing-risks model. However, it should be 
mentioned that most existing studies do not distinguish between states of financial distress, 
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while some only suggest discriminating between the different types of exit or financial 
distress (Lau 1987; Rommer 2004; Rommer 2005). 
The reason for selecting Australia is that it follows the English common law tradition 
that is prevalent in the US and the UK. Furthermore, Australia follows free market policies 
like the US. We seek to provide external validation of the results documented based on 
studies on the US market. We argue that this study is the first attempt to apply the competing-
risks Cox proportional hazards approach for modelling multiple states of corporate financial 
distress in an Australian context. We expect that the factors driving companies to enter 
various states of financial distress are different. More specifically, that distressed external 
administration companies will have a higher leverage, lower past excess returns and a larger 
size; while distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies will have a lower leverage, a 
higher capital utilisation efficiency and a larger size compared to active companies. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews previous 
studies on predicting multiple states of financial distress. Section 3 describes the 
methodology employed in the study. Section 4 describes the data and sample. Section 5 
presents and discusses the empirical results. The final section presents the conclusion and 
draws possible future extensions of this research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
This section reviews the existing background literature. The first sub-section elaborates the 
literature on the multiple states of the financial distress prediction model. The second sub-
section reviews the background literature on the application of the competing-risks model in 
the multiple states of financial distress prediction. 
 
Multiple States of Financial Distress 
 
Most of the existing corporate financial distress prediction literature focusses on the two-state 
failure model. For example, Altman (1968b), Ohlson (1980) and Shumway (2001) examine 
the financial distress factors of companies that went bankrupt. Schary (1991) argues that a 
firm may exit the business in several ways including through merger, acquisition, voluntary 
liquidation or bankruptcy. Each form of these exits is likely to be caused by different factors. 
Hensher, Jones and Greene (2007) argue that outright failure does not capture the full 
spectrum of financial distress in practice. They argue that there are reasons for this, such as: 
financially distressed firms seeking merger or amalgamations; firms eliminating dividend 
payments; and firms defaulting on loans or raising capital to alleviate financial distress. The 
focus on the dichotomy of conventional failing and non-failing only provides a limited 
representation of the financial distress spectrum typically faced by companies in practice 
(Lau 1987; Hensher Jones & Greene 2007). Models that explain failure without considering 
acquisition (Harhoff, Stahl & Woywode 1998), or models that allow for acquisition without 
considering failure, are both likely to suffer from a sample selection problem and thus the 
estimation results can be biased (Koke 2002). 
Several other studies also examine the relationships between multiple states of 
corporate financial distress. For example, Lau (1987) utilises multivariate logit analysis to 
estimate the probability that a firm will enter each of the five ranked financial states.1 The 
results of this study show that multivariate logit analysis outperforms multivariate 
                                                            
1 The considered five multiple states are as follows: State 0 (zero) – financial stability; State 1 – omitting or 
reducing dividend payments; State 2 – technical defaults and default on loan payments; State 3 – protection 
under Chapter X or XI of the American bankruptcy act (US House of Representatives, 2005); and State 4 – 
bankruptcy and liquidation. 
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discriminant analysis, and that for some explanatory variables, the empirical results agree 
with the expectation of the models of prediction time horizons. 
Johnsen and Melicher (1994) also used multinomial logit models to examine the value 
of information in predicting corporate bankruptcy. Their study identifies three states of 
financial distress: non-bankrupt, financially weak and bankrupt firms. The results confirm 
that adding the ‘financially weak’ state can reduce the misclassification error, and the three 
states of financial health appear to be independent. 
Although Lau (1987) improved the two-state failure prediction model by using a five-
state model, it was not without limitations. For example, the multinomial logit used was not 
robust enough for violations of the independent and identically distributed (IID) data and 
independence for irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumptions. These assumptions are considered 
in several studies including Jones and Hensher (2004), Hensher and Jones (2007), Hensher, 
Jones and Greene (2007) and Jones and Hensher (2007). 
In the context of financial distress prediction, Jones and Hensher (2004) demonstrated 
the empirical usefulness of a mixed ordered logit model. Their study introduced a three-state 
financial distress model: State 0 (zero) – non-failed firms; State 1 (one) – insolvent firms; and 
State 2 (two) – firms that filed for bankruptcy and appointed either liquidators or insolvency 
administrators or receivers. Their results also confirmed the superiority of the mixed logit 
over multinomial logit models. 
In a recent study, Hensher and Jones (2007) further extended several ways to optimise 
the explanatory and predictive performance of the mixed logit model in forecasting corporate 
bankruptcy. They investigated five applications of the ordered mixed logit model using a 
three-state failure model. The results revealed that the unconditional triangular distribution 
for random parameters offers the best population-level predictive performance in a hold-out 
sample. 
Hensher, Jones and Greene (2007) also extended the Jones and Hensher (2004) study 
and found that the error component logit model offered an improved explanatory power over 
a standard logit specification. Jones and Hensher (2007) also extended their previous study, 
and found that the nested logit model outperformed a standard logit model. These advanced 
logit models further improved the power of the probability predicting of financial distress. 
 
Competing-risks Model Application 
 
While the standard logit and advanced logit models reviewed in the previous section are 
powerful for predicting the probability of financial distress, they do not deal with the ‘time to 
event’.2 It is the survival analysis techniques which allow the modelling of time to event by 
incorporating it as the dependent variable. Harhoff, Stahl & Woywode (1998) employed the 
competing-risks model to develop an important conceptual and empirical distinction between 
two modes of exit (voluntary liquidation and bankruptcy). Their study was based on German 
firms. The results reveal that pooling exit types is a major source of misspecification. Prantl 
(2003) also examined bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation of the newly founded firms in 
Germany by using the competing-risks model. 
Utilising a competing-risks proportional hazards model, Perez, Llopis and Llopis 
(2002) also found differences in the factors determining exit. They argue that the determinant 
is mainly dependent on the exit route in terms of firm and industry characteristics. Their 
study was based on Spanish firms. Their results further confirmed the findings of Harhoff, 
                                                            
2 Koke (2002) suggest that acquisition and failure tend to be influenced by common factors. This implies that 
they should be examined in combination. 
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Stahl & Woywode (1998) in that pooling exit routes into the same analysis is a major source 
of misspecification. 
Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1999) also employed the competing-risks model, 
specifically the Weibull hazard model and the semi-parametric hazard model, to investigate 
the determinants of UK manufacturing companies making acquisitions. The study confirmed 
that companies making acquisitions can reduce their conditional probability of being taken 
over. 
Rommer (2004) examined three types of exit by Danish non-financial public and 
private limited liability companies using the competing-risks model. The three types of firms 
they investigated included financially distressed firms, voluntarily liquidated firms and 
merger or acquisition firms. It was found that the proportion of correct predictions was higher 
in the competing-risks model than in the pooled logit model. 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) further utilised a competing-risks model to identify the 
characteristics that made individual US banks more likely to fail or to be acquired. It was 
assumed that the causal processes for acquisitions and failures were different, and that the 
occurrence of either event precluded the other, so the competing-risks hazard model was used 
to identify characteristics leading to each outcome. 
To investigate the determinants of time to bankruptcy and time to merger jointly, and 
also to investigate their interdependence, Yu (2006) used the dependent competing-risks 
model assuming that time to bankruptcy and time to merger were interdependent in credit 
cooperatives in Japan. It is argued that the independent competing-risks model, which 
assumed the independence of the two hazards, might not fully describe the failure and merger 
processes, and may thus generate inconsistent estimates. The bankruptcy and merger 
processes can be interrelated, and some unobservable, firm-specific characteristics may exist 
that can affect both bankruptcy and merger processes. Yu (2006) suggests that the common 
practice of assuming the independence of the competing risks would produce biased 
estimates and a lower predictive accuracy. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
In order to examine the determinants of multiple states of corporate financial distress we 
employed the survival analysis model within the competing-risks framework. 
 
Survival Analysis Technique 
 
Survival analysis is a class of statistical method to examine the occurrence and timing of 
events. In survival analysis, an ‘event’ is defined as a qualitative change that can be situated 
in time (Allison 1995, p2). Since companies may change state – from ‘healthy’ to ‘financial 
distress’ – the event of interest in our study is defined as a company entering into a 
financially distressed state. 
Compared to the traditional methods (for example, the Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis (MDA), logit and probit models), two key benefits of survival analysis emerge. 
These include the ability to handle time-varying variables and censored observations. 
Time-varying variables are the explanatory variables that change with time. We used 
financial ratios, market-based data and company-specific variables (which are similar to time-
varying variables), because their values can change over time. We argue that the symptoms of 
financial distress are observable from the deterioration of financial ratios, or that the effect of 
such ratios on corporate failures do not stay constant over time (Luoma & Laitinen 1991). 
Censored observations are those that have never experienced the event during the 
observation time. Censoring occurs when the duration of the study is limited in time. In our 
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study, censored observations are only made on active companies that have not entered into a 
financially distressed state. 
Survival analysis contains two key functions: the survival function and the hazard 
function. The survival function, S(t), gives the probability that the time until the firm 
experiences the event, T, is greater than a given time, t. Thus T is a random variable that 
defines the time event for particular observations. The survival function is stated as follows: 
)Pr()( tTtS >=  (1) 
The hazard function defines the instantaneous risk of an event occurring at time t, 
assuming that the firm survives to time t. The hazard function is also known as the ‘hazard 
rate’ because it is a dimensional quantity that has the number of events per interval of time. 
The hazard function is defined as follows: 
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The relationship between the survival function and the hazard function is that the 
hazard function equals the change in the log-survivor function, as follows: 
.))(ln()(
dt
tsdth −=  (3) 
The Cox proportional hazards model is a semi-parametric model used for survival 
analysis. The Cox (1972) study contains two significant innovations – the proportional 
hazards model and maximum partial likelihood. The proportional hazards model is stated as 
follows: 
)exp()()( 0 βii Xthth =  (4) 
where h0(t) is an arbitrary, unspecified baseline hazard rate that measures the effect of time 
on the hazard rate for an individual whose variables have values of zeros. X represents the 
vector of variables that influences the hazard, and β is the vector of their coefficients. 
Equivalently, the regression model is written as follows: 
log hi(t) = α(t)+ β1Xi1 + β2Xi2 +… + βkX ik (5) 
where hi(t) is hazard function for individual i and α(t) = logh0(t) and h0(t) is an arbitrary, 
unspecified baseline hazard rate (LeClere 2000). 
This model does not require the particular probability distribution specification of the 
survival times. It possesses the property that different individuals have hazard functions that 
are proportional and are thus stated as follows: 
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The ratio of the hazard functions for two individuals does not vary with time t. This special 
property makes the Cox proportional hazard model more robust. 
To estimate the coefficients of β, Cox (1972) proposes a partial likelihood function 
based on a conditional probability of failure by assuming that no tied values exist in the 
survival times. The function was later modified to handle ties (Efron 1977). We used SAS 
PROC PHREG (a SAS programming code for constructing a Cox model) to complete the 
estimation. 
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Competing-risks Model 
 
The risk of entering into any state of financial distress is modelled using a framework in 
which each identified company is concurrently under risk for all states of financial distress 
over the selected period. The undertaken three different states of financial distress are 
considered to be mutually exclusive events (i.e. the occurrence of one type of event removes 
the firm from being at risk for all other types of event), and therefore the competing-risks 
model is deemed to be more appropriate. 
We have estimated the survival likelihood for two subsets of firms (which were 
delisted due to financial distress or takeovers and acquisitions) using a competing-risks Cox’s 
model; where, in addition to survival time, the different causes of an event are observed 
(Andersen, Abildstrom & Rosthoj 2002). 
There are several ways that the problem of competing risks can be approached, but 
the most common approach is to begin by defining a type-specific or cause-specific hazard 
function (Ghilagaber 1998). We have denoted R as representing the different states of 
financial distress which are indexed by the cause-specific hazard for each company (r). r is an 
identification code for each company. Therefore, R ≥ 2 – since our analysis focusses on the 
multiple states of financial distress, including active companies, distressed external 
administration companies and distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. The 
random variable C represents the cause of failure and therefore in the presence of R a cause-
specific hazard function can be defined as follows: 
0
Pr( , )
( ) lim , 1,...,r t
t T t t C r T t
h t r R
tΔ →
≤ < + Δ = ≥
=
Δ
=
)
 (7) 
Where hr(t) is the instantaneous rate of occurrence of type r at time t and in the 
presence of R-1 events. 
The overall hazard of financial distress is the sum of all of the type-specific hazards, 
which is expressed as: 
( )
1
( )
R
r
r
h t h t
=
=∑  (8) 
Narendranathan and Stewart (1991) show that the log-likelihood for the competing-
risks model is additive and can be separated into terms where each term is a function of the 
parameters of a single, cause-specific hazard. Thus, in order to estimate competing-risks Cox 
proportional hazards models, the estimation must first be preceded with the estimation of 
single-risk hazard, treating durations of exit for other reasons than filed for external 
administration process or subject to a takeover, merger or acquisition arrangement as 
censored at the point of completion. 
Therefore, a further estimation model is needed and stated as follows: 
0 (( ) ( ) exp( )ri r ri t rh t h t X β=  (9) 
Where r = f (distressed external administration, distressed takeover, merger or 
acquisition). 
Two separate Cox proportional hazards models are also estimated for the competing 
risks, and the other states of financial distresses are considered as censored observations. 
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4. Data and sample 
 
To apply the competing-risks Cox proportional hazards form of survival analysis to the 
population of all companies listed on the ASX, we used annual data of financial ratios, stock 
prices and company-specific variables of Age and Size for the period 1989 to 2005. We 
excluded the companies in the financial sectors from the analysis because of their different 
financial statements structure.3 
For our analysis, financial distress is defined in three unordered mutually exclusive 
states, as follows: 
 
State 0: Active companies. 
State 1: Distressed external administration companies. These companies are defined as 
financially distressed companies which have filed for an external administration 
process. As per the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), four categories of external 
administration process exist: (1) voluntary administration; (2) scheme of arrangement; 
(3) receivership; and (4) liquidation (Attorney-General’s Department 2005). The date 
of entering into external administration was purchased from the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC)4. 
State 2: Distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. This state is defined as 
financially distressed companies which were delisted from the ASX because they 
were subject to a takeover, merger or acquisition arrangement. The data for delisted 
reasons, company announcement and delisted date are collected from the FinAnalysis 
database. 
 
As pointed out by Clark and Ofek (1994), if a firm experiences operating or financial 
difficulties then there exist several potential actions. One such remedy is to restructure 
financially distressed firms through a merger. Therefore, including distressed takeover, 
merger or acquisition provides an opportunity to further examine more diverse states of 
financial distress. 
A sample of active and distressed companies in State 0, State 1 and State 2 was 
collected for the period from 1989 to 2005. The final sample consisted of 891 active listed 
companies, 50 distressed external administration companies and 140 distressed takeover, 
merger or acquisition companies. 
Time to event or survival time is defined as follows: for distressed companies, the 
survival time is the total number of years from the first year when data is available to the year 
of financial distress. This definition is applied to both distressed external administration 
companies and distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. For active companies, 
the survival time is the total number of years from the first year when data is available to the 
last year observed. During the study period, each of the companies were analysed to follow 
up whether they experienced an event in one of the multiple states of financial distress (e.g. 
filed for an external administration process or were subjected to a takeover, merger or 
acquisition arrangement). 
                                                            
3  Ideally, we would have liked to use the information from the entire history of a company since its 
establishment, but such financial statement information was not available prior to the fiscal year 1989. 
Therefore, the models presented in this study are based on duration data truncated to the left, because they 
pertain only to the period since 1989. 
 
4 The authors are grateful to the School of Accounting and Finance and the School of Mathematics and Applied 
Statistics, University of Wollongong, for financial support in obtaining the data. 
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The explanatory variables used in the model are financial ratios, market-based data 
and company-specific variables. Financial ratios have long been widely used in explaining 
the possibility of corporate financial distress (see Beaver (1966); Altman (1968a); Bongini, 
Ferri & Hahm (2000); Routledge & Gadenne (2000); Catanach & Perry (2001); and Rommer 
(2005)). In a seminal study, Beaver (1966) used financial ratios with a univariate technique. 
According to Beaver (1966), six financial ratios were the best predictors in financial failure 
prediction: (1) cash flow to total debt; (2) net income to total assets; (3) total liabilities to 
total assets; (4) working capital to total assets; (5) current ratio; and (6) no credit interval. 
Altman (1968a) develops the well-known Z score model utilising multivariate discriminant 
analysis as the technique including the financial ratios as explanatory variables. It was found 
that five financial ratios are the best predictors in the corporate bankruptcy prediction model: 
(1) working capital to total assets; (2) retained earnings to total assets; (3) earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets; (4) market value equity to par value of debt; and (5) sales to 
total assets. 
We have incorporated financial ratios measured in four main categories of firms 
including profitability, liquidity, leverage and activity ratios in the model. The selection 
criteria is based on the following: (1) data availability in the FinAnalysis database consisting 
of financial statements of Australian firms; (2) the selected predictive variables from previous 
studies; and (3) the significance of the selected variables. Finally, there are nine financial 
ratios considered in the model as follows: earnings before interest and taxes margin (EBIT 
margin), return on equity and return on assets are used to measure profitability; current ratio, 
quick ratio and working capital to total assets ratio are used in order to measure firm 
liquidity; debt ratio is used to measure a firm’s leverage; and capital turnover and total asset 
turnover are used to measure the efficiency of a firm’s assets utilisation. 
Market-based data is also used to investigate the relationship of market returns and 
the likelihood of financial distress. Shumway (2001) used two market-driven variables 
including a firm’s past excess returns (or market-adjusted returns) and idiosyncratic standard 
deviation of firm’s stock returns in forecasting bankruptcy. The hazard model results of this 
study indicate that the use of the market variable is only representative at the 5% significance 
level. However, when both market and accounting variables are used, the idiosyncratic 
standard deviation of a firm’s stock is not a significant variable in forecasting bankruptcy. 
These results are also consistent with Mossman et al. (1998). According to Mossman et al. 
(1998), for a 12 month period, the market-adjusted return variable is significant in bankruptcy 
prediction model while the standard variation variable of market-adjusted return is not 
significant in forecasting bankruptcy. 
As financial ratios can be window-dressed using creative accounting to show 
improved financial figures, we include the company’s past excess returns as market-based 
data in the model. The standard deviation of a firm’s stock returns is omitted due to a lack of 
available data for the company’s monthly stock returns. 
Company specific variables (such as age, size and squared size) are also included in 
the analysis. We use the natural logarithm of sales as the proxy for company size, and the 
number of years since registration as the proxy for company age to test the association 
between company age and size for corporate endurance. 
To allow for the non-linear relationship between company size and the likelihood of 
financial distress, we also include the square of size. This is consistent with the previous 
literature relating to ownership structure and firm performance. For example, Himmelberg, 
Hubbard and Palia (1999) and Kumar (2003) incorporate the squared company size to allow 
for the non-linearity in examining the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
value or performance. 
The detail of the variables used in this study is shown in Table 1 (see Appendices). 
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5. Empirical Results 
 
To examine the determinants of multiple states of financial distress, both the single-risk and 
competing-risks model are estimated. This section provides the empirical results obtained 
from both the univariate model and the multivariate model. To provide an overall picture 
about the characteristics of the data employed in the model, the next section will describe the 
empirical results regarding descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficient. Then, the 
following sections will discuss the results of the single-risk and competing-risks models. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics (see Appendices). Sample means, medians, standard 
deviations, skewness, kurtosis and the number of observations are presented for each 
financial distress state. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test and its p-value are the result of a non-parametric test showing 
the difference between the group means. Variables with a significant difference within the 
group means are expected to add information to a regression analysis. The results show that 
all variables display a significant difference between the three states of financial distress at 
the 5% level except for the variable Age. 
It is important to note that before truncation the financial ratios employed have very 
large standard deviations. This is due to several outliers which might have influenced the 
results. Unlike many previous studies, we use the truncation technique to minimise the effect 
of the outliers. All observations with variable values higher than the 99th percentile for each 
variable are set to truncate the values. All variable values lower than the 1st percentile of each 
variable are then truncated. This is consistent with Shumway (2001). After truncation, the 
behaviour of the data (especially the financial ratios) has significantly improved as their 
standard deviations are much smaller than before the truncation. However, it is important also 
to note that the 99th percentile and the 1st percentile are just arbitrary values5. Table 2 reports 
these values after truncation. 
As shown in Table 2, the means of earnings before taxes (EBT) of all states of the 
company are negative, which show the low ability of the company to generate profit. This 
shows that the financially distressed companies lost earnings compared to the active 
companies. The means of return on equity (ROE) for distressed takeover, merger or 
acquisition companies are positive, which implies that these companies have a higher ability 
to generate earnings than both active and distressed external administration companies. 
Similar results are observed for return on assets (ROA). The mean of ROA is also positive for 
distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies, while it is negative for active and 
distressed external administration companies. 
For liquidity ratios, the means of financially distressed companies for both current 
ratio (CUR) and quick ratio (QUK) are lower than those of the active companies. This shows 
that distressed companies have a greater ability to meet their current obligations compared to 
the active companies. 
It is found that financially distressed companies in all states have a lesser capacity to 
pay off their long term liabilities compared to the active companies, which indicates the 
means of debt ratio (DET). 
For activity ratios, capital turnover (CPT) and total asset turnover (TAT), the mean 
values of both ratios show mixed results. For the variable CPT, the mean value for active 
companies is higher than for distressed external administration companies but lower than for 
                                                            
5 The values are considered arbitrary here because we do not know exactly what the optimal threshold to be used 
is. 
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distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. However, the means of TAT for 
financially distressed companies in all states are higher than the active companies. 
The mean value of companies’ SIZE implies that the size of financially distressed 
companies in all states is larger than the size of active companies. The Age of distressed 
external administration and distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies is higher 
than the size of the active companies. 
Finally, the mean of excess returns (EXR) suggests that the past excess returns for 
active companies is higher than for the distressed external administration companies but 
lower than for the distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. 
 
Correlation Coefficients 
 
In order to investigate the relationships between the variables, an examination of the 
correlation coefficients across the variables was carried out. The Pearson correlation 
coefficients are shown in Table 3 (see Appendices). The results indicate weak relationships 
across most of the variables except for current (CUR) and quick (QUK) ratios which are 
highly correlated. Since both these two financial ratios measure liquidity, we only use CUR 
as the proxy for liquidity ratios in the following regressions. These results suggest that most 
of the employed variables in the study provide unique information for the model. 
 
The Model Estimation Results 
 
In order to examine the determinants of multiple states of financial distress, and to compare 
pooled data with the competing-risks model, nine financial ratios, a market-based variable 
and three company specific variables are analysed into Cox’s model. The variables used are 
time-dependent variables covering the period from 1989 to 2005. The estimation results of 
the competing-risks model are presented in Table 4 (see Appendices). 
In order to highlight the effect of allowing for multiple states of financial distress, the 
estimation results are presented from both the single-risk model or pooled model (where all 
states of financial distress are pooled together) and the competing-risks model. Panel (A) 
contains the results for the single-risk model while Panel (B) contains the competing-risks 
model estimation. The coefficients estimation for each panel with the relative p-values for 
testing the null hypothesis is shown in the first two columns and the hazard ratio is presented 
in the last column. 
The hazard ratio is obtained by computing eβ, where β is the coefficient in the 
proportional hazards model. A hazard ratio equal to 1 indicates that the variable has no effect 
on survival. A hazard ratio greater (less) than 1 indicates a faster (slower) hazard timing. 
 
Single-risk Model Estimation 
 
When we pooled all of the different states of financial distress together, three variables were 
found to be highly significant at the 5% level. These variables are TAT, SIZE and SIZE2 with 
the coefficients of -0.1825, 1.2398 and -0.0302 respectively. The variables ROA and DET are 
also significant at 10% with the estimated coefficients -0.4461 and 0.3275 respectively. 
The coefficient of TAT is negative, indicating an increase in the firm’s ability to 
utilise assets which can decrease the hazards of becoming financially distressed. The hazard 
ratio for TAT is 0.8330. This indicates a unit increase in the total assets turnover ratio, and the 
risk of becoming financially distressed decreased by 16.7%. The positive sign of SIZE 
indicates that the larger the size of a company the higher the likelihood that it becomes 
financially distressed. This is because a large company might have inflexible management 
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and have problems monitoring managers and employees; consequently, the company may 
have inefficient communication and then face financial difficulties (Rommer 2004). 
Considering SIZE2, the result suggests that the effect of company size on financial 
distress is the inverted U-shaped or bell-shaped curve. However, this finding is not consistent 
with Rommer (2004), who suggests a U-shaped relationship between firm size and the 
likelihood of financial distress. 
One possible explanation for this is that the sample used is not totally representative 
of the population for both publicly listed and non-listed Australian companies. The sample 
with a relatively large size might have captured only the effect of size on the likelihood of 
financial distress for those companies. In other words, the results might not have captured the 
effect of company size on financial distress for non-publicly listed companies which are 
relatively small in size. 
In addition, the coefficient of ROA is negative, indicating that an increase in a firm’s 
ability to generate earnings can decrease the hazard of becoming financially distressed. The 
hazard ratio for ROA is 0.6400 which indicates a unit increase in ROA, and the risk of 
becoming financially distressed decreases by 36%. This is consistent with the expectation 
that companies with a high ability to generate earnings are less likely to face financial 
difficulties. 
The estimated variable DET is positive, indicating that the company with a low debt 
ratio is less likely to become financially distressed. The hazard ratio for DET is 1.3880. That 
is, for every unit increase in debt ratio, the risk of becoming financially distressed increases 
by 38.8%. 
 
Competing-risks Model Estimation 
 
The empirical results are reported in Table 4 (see Appendices). From the estimation results, 
we found that the working capital to total assets ratio (WCA) and EXR are significant factors 
in explaining the risk of financial distress through an external administration process but they 
do not significantly affect the risk of the takeover, merger or acquisition of a company. 
It is also found that WCA significantly affects the risk of filing an external 
administration process, but it does not drive the risk of the takeover, merger or acquisition of 
a company. The coefficient of WCA is positive, indicating an increase in working capital to 
total assets ratio which can enhance the possibility of the hazard facing an external 
administration process. The ratio used for measuring the company liquidity, as considered in 
Altman (1968a), shows that a firm experiencing consistent operating losses will have 
shrinking current assets in relation to total assets. This result contrasts the expected results in 
that a company with a high liquidity should have a lower likelihood of facing financial 
difficulties. 
For EXR, the coefficient is negative, indicating an increase in a company’s past excess 
returns which decreases the hazards of becoming financially distressed. The hazard ratio for 
EXR is 0.4710 indicating an increase of one unit in a company’s past excess returns which 
implies a 52.9% decrease in the risk of financial distress. This indicates the potential of 
market data as a good predictor of corporate financial distress. Shumway (2001) and 
Partington et al. (2006) also reported similar consistent findings. 
The variables DET and SIZE significantly affect the hazard of entering financial 
distress both through external administration and through takeover, merger or acquisition. 
The variable DET has different signs between the distressed external administration model 
and the distressed takeover, merger or acquisition model. In the distressed external 
administration model, DET has a positive coefficient, while in the distressed takeover, merger 
or acquisition model, DET has a negative coefficient. These results imply that the company 
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with a lower debt to total assets ratio is less likely to file an external administration process 
but is more likely to be a candidate for takeover, merger or acquisition. Schary (1991) also 
found that debt ratio is negatively related to the probability of a merger. The reasonable 
explanation for this result is that companies with lower leverage ratios are likely to be 
attractive targets to acquirers who have perhaps taken on debt to enable them to purchase the 
company (Dickerson, Gibson & Tsakalotos 1999). 
The coefficient sign of SIZE is positive in both models. The positive sign of SIZE 
indicates that the larger the size of a company the higher the likelihood of entering into 
financial distress; both through the external administration process and through takeover, 
merger or acquisition. One reason for this is that a large company might have inflexible 
management and thus have problems monitoring managers and employees thus leading to 
inefficient communication (Rommer 2004). Perez, Llopis and Llopis (2002) also report 
consistent results showing that the risk of acquisition increases with company size and 
suggest that large firms tend to be involved in mergers. 
The covariant CPT and squared size of the company (SIZE2) are found to 
significantly affect the risk of the takeover, merger or acquisition of a company, but this is 
not significantly related to the probability of entering an external administration process. 
The coefficient sign of CPT is positive, implying an increase in the operating revenue 
to operating invested capital, indicating an increased hazard for the takeover, merger or 
acquisition of the company. A reasonable explanation for this is that a company which uses 
its assets efficiently will increase its income and liquidity position, and therefore it is more 
attractive for its takeover, merger or acquisition. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) also found 
consistent results in identifying the determinants of bank failure and acquisition. The authors 
suggest that inefficient banks, in terms of excessive use or payment for physical plant or 
labour, are less likely to be acquired. 
The estimated coefficient for SIZE2 of distressed takeover, merger or acquisition is 
negative. This suggests that the effect of company size on distressed takeover, merger or 
acquisition is the inverted U-shaped or bell-shaped curve. This finding is consistent with 
Bhattacharjee et al. (2004), who also found a bell-shaped relationship between firm size and 
the likelihood of being acquired. In particular, their findings support medium-sized listed 
firms being more likely candidates for acquisition. 
In summary, our results suggest that there are differences in the factors determining 
which companies enter the different states of financial distress. Specifically, distressed 
external administration companies have a higher leverage, lower past excess returns and a 
larger size compared to active companies. In comparison, distressed takeover, merger or 
acquisition companies have a lower leverage, a higher capital utilisation efficiency and a 
larger size compared to active companies. 
 
Comparing the Models 
 
Comparing the estimation results between the single-risk model and the competing-risks 
model, we found that DET and SIZE are common significant variables in both the single-risk 
model and the competing-risks model. 
The coefficient signs of DET in the single-risk and the distressed external 
administration in the competing-risks model are both positive, which indicates that the 
company with the lower debt-to-total assets ratio is less likely to become financially 
distressed. However, the sign of the parameter for DET is negative for a distressed takeover, 
merger or acquisition in the competing-risks model. This indicates that the company with the 
higher debt has a lower probability of becoming a distressed takeover, merger or acquisition 
company. 
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The coefficient SIZE is positive in the single-risk model as well as the two 
specifications in the competing-risks model. This result implies that company size has the 
same effect on the hazard for financial distress in the single-risk model as on the hazard for 
filing an external administration process and the hazard for distressed takeover, merger or 
acquisition in the competing-risks model. In particular, the results suggest that the larger the 
size of the company, the greater the likelihood of becoming financially distressed. 
It should be noted that some variables (i.e. ROA and TAT) that affect the hazard of 
financial distress in the single-risk model may not significantly affect the hazard of distressed 
external administration and distressed takeover, merger or acquisition in the competing-risks 
model. 
The estimation of the competing-risks model shows that the covariant ROA is 
negative, which implies that a company with a high profitability has a decreased likelihood of 
facing financial difficulties. It is found that the variable TAT has a negative estimated sign, 
which suggests that companies with a higher ability to utilise assets are less likely to fail. 
The variable AGE was never found to be significant in explaining financial distress 
for all model specifications. This finding is consistent with the results of Shumway (2001). 
Considering the three-state financial distress model specifically (comprising active 
companies, distressed external administration companies and distressed takeover, merger or 
acquisition companies within the framework of a competing-risks model), it is found that 
each state of financial distress is caused by different factors. The empirical estimation results 
of a single-risk and a competing-risks model are also compared. The results indicate that both 
model specifications result in different significant variables for explaining financial distress. 
Therefore, we conclude that distinguishing the financial distress states is an important 
consideration to develop the model. This finding is consistent with Harhoff, Stahl and 
Woywode (1998), Perez, Llopis and Llopis (2002) and Rommer (2004). Harhoff, Stahl and 
Woywode (1998) conclude that a separate consideration of the modes of corporate exit is 
highly desirable, they reveal that pooling exit types is a major source of misspecification, and 
they also show how the econometric results may be misleading if the distinction between exit 
modes is not made. 
 
Survival Probability Evaluation for Multiple States of Financial Distress 
 
The survival functions of typically active, distressed external administration and distressed 
takeover, merger or acquisition companies are presented in Figure 1 (below). The survival 
function defines the probability that a company will survive longer than t time units. The 
function starts with 1 at the beginning, and declines as more companies become financially 
distressed. 
The survival function shown in Figure 1 is produced by averaging the estimated 
survival probability of companies by the different states of financial distress (that is, State 0: 
active companies; State 1: distressed external administration companies; and State 2: 
distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies). 
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Figure 1 
Graph of Survival Function and Survival Time by Financial Distress States 
 
 
 
According to Figure 1, the survival probability of typical financially distressed 
external administration companies is lower than that of typical active companies and 
distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. The survival probability starts with 1 
and slightly declines afterward. The noticeable decrease in corporate survival for distressed 
external administration companies occurs after 9 years as more companies become 
financially distressed. 
The probability of survival beyond 17 years for active and distressed takeover, merger 
or acquisition companies is approximately 88.61% and 90.18% respectively; while that for 
distressed external administration companies is approximately 76.77%. The survival profile 
of active companies and distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies is very similar. 
Additionally, the probability that distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies will 
survive beyond year 12 to year 14, and also year 16 to year 17, is slightly higher than that of 
active companies. One possible explanation for these results is that distressed takeover, 
merger or acquisition companies have a lower leverage, a higher capital utilisation efficiency 
and a larger size compared to active companies. Therefore, these companies have a slightly 
higher probability of survival than active companies. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Companies face a range of financial health states, and may exit the market in several ways 
such as through merger, acquisition, voluntary liquidation or bankruptcy, where each form of 
exit is likely to be caused by different factors. Models that allow for multiple states of 
financial distress provide a wider range of distress scenarios that public companies typically 
face in reality. Therefore this study focussed on examining the determinants of multiple states 
of financial distress using the competing-risks model and comparing the empirical results to 
the pooled model. 
To examine the determinants of multiple states of financial distress, this study 
provided an unordered three-state financial distress model based on a sample of publicly 
listed Australian non-financial companies, which combined traditional financial ratios, 
market-based variables and company-specific variables with a survival analysis technique in 
the form of the competing-risks Cox proportional hazards model. The three-state financial 
distress was defined as: State 0: active companies; State 1: distressed external administration 
companies; and State 2: distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies. 
We incorporated 891 active companies, 50 distressed external administration 
companies and 140 distressed takeover, merger or acquisition companies over the period 
1989 to 2005, by utilising the competing-risks Cox proportional hazards model with the 
proposed variables. Four main categories of financial ratios (profitability, liquidity, leverage 
and activity) were used as indicators of financial distress. The company’s past excess returns 
were additionally used as a proxy for market-based data. The relationships between 
company-specific variables (age, size, squared size and corporate endurance) were also 
examined. 
The results show that differences exist in the factors which determine whether 
companies enter different states of financial distress. Specifically, distressed external 
administration companies have a higher leverage, lower past excess returns and a larger size 
compared to active companies. Meanwhile, distressed takeover, merger or acquisition 
companies have a lower leverage, a higher capital utilisation efficiency and a larger size 
compared to active companies. The conclusion from comparing the results from the single-
risk model and the competing-risks model is that distinguishing between financial distress 
states is important. However, the results do not support the importance of the company age 
factor in explaining financial distress. 
Further implications of this study relate to future research on potential factors for 
predicting corporate failure which need to be considered, such as corporate governance 
variables and macroeconomic variables. 
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Appendices 
 
Table 1 
The Covariates used in the Study 
Category No. Covariate Code Definition 
Profitability 1.  EBIT margin  EBT EBIT / operating revenue 
 2.  Return on equity ROE NPAT before abnormals / (shareholders equity-outside equity interests) 
 3.  Return on assets ROA Earnings before interest / (total assets-outside equity interests) 
Liquidity 4.  Current ratio CUR Current assets / current liabilities 
 5.  Quick ratio QUK (Current assets-current inventory) / current liabilities 
 6.  Working capital/total assets WCA Working capital / total assets 
Leverage 7.  Debt ratio DET Total debts / total assets 
Activity 8.  Capital turnover CPT Operating revenue / operating-invested capital before goodwill 
 9.  Total asset turnover TAT Operating revenues / total assets 
Company-Specific  10.  Size of company SIZE Natural logarithm of sales 
 11.  Squared size SIZE2 The square of natural logarithm of sales 
 12.  Age of company AGE The number of years since registration 
Market Based 13.  Excess returns (year t) EXR A company’s stock return in year t-1 minus ASX 200 index return in year t-1
 
Note: All data were obtained from the FinAnalysis Database, Aspect Huntley Company — except for the S&P/ASX 200 monthly index data,  
which were obtained from the Dx Database.
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of the Data 
 ROE ROA CUR QUK WCA DET CPT TAT SIZE SIZE2 AGE EXR 
Active (n = 891)             
Mean -0.1404 -0.1301 7.2254 6.9260 0.0415 0.3942 3.3850 0.7713 15.4840 253.6566 19.4838 -0.1211 
Median   1.7600 1.3000 0.0128 0.3433 0.9230 0.4394     
Min -0.0081 -0.0085 0.0500 0.0400 -1.0000 0.0047 0.0002 0.0002 15.9391 254.0548 14.0000 -0.0805 
Max   155.0900 155.0900 0.6999 3.5587 82.7817 5.7367     
Std. Dev. -4.2639 -2.3701   0.2201 0.4282  0.9912 6.7708 45.8436 1.0000 -2.2731 
Skewness   18.6848 18.7216 -0.9343 3.9324 9.9278 2.3255 22.5982 510.6794 90.0000  
Kurtosis 2.5722 0.3884 5.4057 5.3990 5.8129 23.7046 6.3372 6.9079    2.0433 
 0.7526 0.4061 33.4315 33.3725   44.3049  3.7188 111.9211 18.4983 0.7280 
-2.4059 -3.3643       -0.3126   -0.0737 
         0.1798 2.0393  
13.9761 13.5418       -0.5608 -0.6265 4.1816 1.1784 
Distressed External Administration (n = 50) 
Mean -0.1022 -0.1587 5.1382 4.9091 0.0282 0.5859 2.9237 0.8548 15.8297 259.8330 22.0454 -0.2475 
Median 
Min 
 
0.0025 
 
-0.0062 
1.3200 
0.0500 
1.0400 
0.0400 
0.0106 
-1.0000 
0.4556 
0.0047 
0.8820 
0.0004 
0.4533 
0.0002 
 
16.4390 
 
270.2389 
 
17.0000 
 
-0.2096 
Max -4.2639  155.0900 155.0900 0.6999 3.5587 51.4800 5.7367     
Std. Dev.  -2.3701   0.2756 0.7348  1.1424 7.4396 55.3470 1.0000 -2.2731 
Skewness 2.5722  17.3525 17.3967 -1.4149 2.9279 6.9209 2.6287 21.5449 464.1840 90.0000  
Kurtosis 0.7766 0.3884 7.2412 7.2240 5.0272 8.6108 4.8427 7.9975    2.0433 
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 ROE ROA CUR QUK WCA DET CPT TAT SIZE SIZE2 AGE EXR 
 -1.5362 0.5007 55.7535 55.5423   26.4602  3.0109 89.6430 16.6491 0.8061 
 -3.2754       -0.6863 -0.2302  -0.0785 
10.7583         -0.3737 1.3985  
 10.7957       -0.0097  2.6935 1.0194 
Distressed Takeover, Merger or Acquisition (n = 140) 
Mean 0.0270 0.0124 3.6748 3.2616 0.0827 0.4907 3.7742 1.0201 17.9684 329.6880 22.2363 -0.0691 
Median 
Min 
0.0825 
-4.2639 
0.0538 
-2.3701 
1.5000 
0.0500 
1.0100 
0.0400 
0.0460 
-1.0000 
0.4663 
0.0047 
1.5115 
0.0003 
0.8167 
0.0002 
 
18.1779 
 
330.4352 
 
14.0000 
 
-0.0556 
Max   155.0900 155.0900 0.6999 3.5587 82.7817 5.7367     
Std. Dev. 2.5722 0.3884   0.1951 0.4269  0.9212 6.9078 47.7171 1.0000 -2.2731 
Skewness 0.5037 0.2137 11.7242 11.7859 -0.3701 4.9554 9.1551 2.1054 22.4284 503.0313 90.0000  
Kurtosis -3.8848 -6.4543 8.5974 8.5643 4.7533 32.1249 5.8140 6.7491    2.0433 
   87.2817 86.6035   39.5832  2.6052 86.8882 20.6510  
38.0125 57.7766       -1.0868 -0.5215  0.5769 
         0.2680 1.4579  
        1.7751  1.4020 0.1276 
           2.9682 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
p-value 
43.4135 
<.0001 
64.7073 
<.0001 
33.3688 
<.0001 
37.5854 
<.0001 
9.3162 
0.0095 
22.3618 
<.0001 
7.2498 
0.0267 
21.2755 
<.0001 
70.2482 
<.0001 
70.6205 
<.0001 
2.6275 
0.2688 
9.9025 
0.0071 
 
Note: Descriptive statistics are grouped by company status. Kruskal-Wallis test from a non-parametric test of equality of group means. 
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Covariate EBT ROE ROA CUR QUK WCA DET CPT TAT SIZE SIZE2 AGE EXR 
EBT 1.0000* 0.1027 <.0001 
0.1692 
<.0001 
-0.0919 
<.0001 
-0.0948 
<.0001 
0.0763 
<.0001 
0.0931 
<.0001 
0.0638 
<.0001 
0.1756 
<.0001 
0.4567 
<.0001 
0.3843 
<.0001 
0.0686 
<.0001 
-0.0017 
0.8579 
ROE  1.0000 0.4624 <.0001 
-0.0176 
0.0572 
-0.0200 
0.0306 
0.0467 
<.0001 
0.1441 
<.0001 
0.0008 
0.9295 
0.1562 
<.0001 
0.2395 
<.0001 
0.2454 
<.0001 
0.0740 
<.0001 
0.0817 
<.0001 
ROA   1.0000 -0.0262 0.0047 
-0.0307 
0.0009 
0.3627 
<.0001 
-0.2213 
<.0001 
-0.0370 
<.0001 
0.1096 
<.0001 
0.3738 
<.0001 
0.3773 
<.0001 
0.1085 
<.0001 
0.1242 
<.0001 
CUR    1.0000 0.9995 <.0001
0.0885 
<.0001 
-0.2531 
<.0001 
-0.0513 
<.0001 
-0.1821 
<.0001 
-0.3051 
<.0001 
-0.2966 
<.0001 
-0.0951 
<.0001 
-0.0172 
0.0640 
QUK     1.0000 0.0773 <.0001 
-0.2525 
<.0001 
-0.0496 
<.0001 
-0.1864 
<.0001 
-0.3125 
<.0001 
-0.3038 
<.0001 
-0.1000 
<.0001 
-0.0181 
0.0503 
WCA      1.0000 -0.3456 <.0001 
-0.1213 
<.0001 
0.0665 
<.0001 
0.1979 
<.0001 
0.1973 
<.0001 
0.1327 
<.0001 
0.0624 
<.0001 
DET       1.0000 0.1252 <.0001 
0.3926 
<.0001 
0.2719 
<.0001 
0.2683 
<.0001 
0.0696 
<.0001 
-0.0372 
<.0001 
CPT        1.0000 0.3770 <.0001 
0.1291 
<.0001 
0.1190 
<.0001 
-0.0250 
0.0069 
-0.0461 
<.0001 
TAT         1.0000 0.5000 <.0001 
0.4940 
<.0001 
0.1346 
<.0001 
0.0109 
0.2408 
SIZE          1.0000 0.9900 <.0001
0.2905 
<.0001 
0.0639 
<.0001 
SIZE2           1.0000 0.3130 <.0001 
0.0728 
<.0001 
AGE            1.0000 0.0644 <.0001 
EXR             1.0000 
 
Note: * Pearson correlation coefficients. The p-value is under the null hypothesis of zero correlation. 
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Table 4 
Single-risk and Competing-risks Cox Proportional Hazards Model Estimation 
Covariate               (A) Single-Risk Model 
                                                       (B) Competing-Risks Model
Distressed External Administration Companies Distressed Takeover, Merger or Acquisition Companies 
Coefficient p-Value Hazard Ratio Coefficient p-Value Hazard Ratio Coefficient p-Value Hazard Ratio 
EBT -0.0018 0.1790 0.9980 -0.0006 0.7029 0.9990 -0.0019 0.5152 0.9980 
ROE -0.0254 0.7962 0.9750 -0.0805 0.5584 0.9230 0.0195 0.9083 1.0200 
ROA -0.4461* 0.0584 0.6400 -0.4143 0.1766 0.6610 -0.3871 0.3597 0.6790 
CUR -0.2703 0.1742 0.7667 -0.6156 0.1789 0.5435 -0.1787 0.4446 0.8359 
WCA 0.2065 0.6242 1.2290 0.9740* 0.0738 2.6490 -0.3987 0.5314 0.6710 
DET 0.3275* 0.0968 1.3880 0.9205** <.0001 2.5100 -0.7975* 0.0596 0.4500 
CPT 0.0086 0.2060 1.0090 -0.0053 0.7541 0.9950 0.0131* 0.0915 1.0130 
TAT -0.1825** 0.0497 0.8330 -0.1919 0.2401 0.8250 -0.1554 0.1809 0.8560 
SIZE 1.2398** 0.0001 3.4550 0.8393* 0.0753 2.3150 1.6956** 0.0003 5.4500 
SIZE2 -0.0302** 0.0008 0.9700 -0.0223 0.1161 0.9780 -0.0412** 0.0014 0.9600 
AGE -0.0031 0.4312 0.9970 -0.0014 0.8751 0.9990 -0.0028 0.5224 0.9970 
EXR -0.1375 0.2219 0.8720 -0.7538** 0.0002 0.4710 0.1167 0.3925 1.1240 
Number of events 190 50 140 
 
Note: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. 
